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Symbolic power in European diplomacy: the
struggle between national foreign services and
the EU’s External Action Service
REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN*
Abstract. National diplomacy is challenged by the rise of non-state actors from transnational
companies to non-governmental organisations. In trying to explain these challenges, scholars
tend to either focus on a specific new actor or argue that states will remain the dominant diplo-
matic players. This article develops an alternative Bourdieu-inspired framework addressing
symbolic power. It conceptualises diplomacy in terms of a social field with agents (field incum-
bents and newcomers alike) who co-construct and reproduce the field by struggling for domi-
nant positions. The framework is applied to the EU’s new diplomatic service (the European
External Action Service, EEAS), which is one of the most important foreign policy inventions
in Europe to date. I show that the EEAS does not challenge national diplomacy in a material
sense – but at a symbolic level. The EEAS questions the state’s meta-capital, that is, its mono-
poly of symbolic power and this explains the counter-strategies adopted by national foreign
services. The struggles to define the ‘genuine’ diplomat reveal a rupture in the European diplo-
matic field, pointing towards a transformation of European statehood and the emergence of a
hybrid form of diplomacy. A focus on symbolic power opens up new avenues for the study of
transformations of authority in world politics.
Rebecca Adler-Nissen is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Uni-
versity of Copenhagen. Previously she has worked as Head of Section in the Danish Ministry
for Foreign Affairs. Her research focuses on international political sociology, diplomacy,
sovereignty, and European integration. She is editor of Bourdieu in International Relations:
Rethinking Key Concepts in IR (Routledge, 2012) and author of Opting Out of the European
Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Introduction
The rise of non-state actors on the global scene appears to transform diplomacy.
These new actors, ranging from transnational companies to global media, over non-
governmental organisations to multilateral organisations, challenge the image of
1
* I wish to thank the editors, the four anonymous reviewers, and Graham Avery, Jozef Ba´tora, Costas
Constantinou, Noe Cornago, Gunther Hellman, Niilo Kauppi, Mikael Rask Madsen, Dorte Martinsen,
Ian Manners, Peter Nedergaard, Iver B. Neumann, Lene Hansen, Ben Rosamond, David Spence,
Morten Holm-Hemmingsen, and Annika Bergman Rosamond, for their helpful comments. I owe great
thanks to Fabrice Jacobsen and Ida Malou Jensen for assistance with the data collection. Moreover,
I am grateful to employees at the EEAS and the Danish, French, Polish, and German Ministries of
Foreign Affairs. Last but not least, I wish to thank my colleagues for sharing their thoughts and expe-
riences with me while I was working as a Head of Section in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(September 2010–September 2011). I am of course solely responsible for any mistakes in this article.
national diplomats as ‘custodians of the idea of international society’.1 Also domesti-
cally, national foreign services (in most Western countries) are under pressure from
increased and more autonomous international activities by other ministries and a
greater concentration of foreign policy activities around prime ministers and presidents,
thereby side-lining the foreign ministries themselves. Symbolically, new articulations of
collective representation, differing from the traditional promotion of national interests,
such as the ‘No Logo’ movement, the Seattle demonstrations, and various attempts
to create a transnational public sphere challenge territorial-based diplomacy.2
This article examines one of the most important foreign policy inventions in
Europe to date: a diplomatic service of the European Union. The creation of a
High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and an External Action Service
(EEAS), as it is officially called, remains one of the Treaty of Lisbon’s controversial
inventions. Since 1 December 2010, the EEAS has been given the task to serve the
EU’s common foreign policy, represent the European Union (EU) around the world,
and develop common strategies on everything from EU peacekeeping missions to
humanitarian aid3 and possibly consular affairs for EU citizens abroad.4 This new
diplomatic body will bring together – for the first time – national diplomats, civil
servants from the Commission, and officials from the Council secretariat under the
same roof. The EEAS currently only employs about 3,400 people and is thus com-
parable in size to the foreign service of a medium-size member state. Yet the creation
of a fully integrated European foreign service has been met with anxieties by observers
in the EU member states, fearing that it will eventually undermine national diplomacy.
As Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb puts it, ‘[a] lot of us [foreign ministers]
are going through a bit of an existential crisis’ because of the Union’s new institutions.5
However, decisions on EU foreign policy are still taken unanimously, and Europe
remains divided over important foreign policy issues. How can such a small organi-
sation – with a Brussels headquarters under construction and understaffed delega-
tions in third countries – be so anxiety-provoking in Europe?
Studies of diplomacy and EU foreign policy have tended to focus on institutional
or material changes and have ignored or downplayed the symbolic changes that are
also in progress. Thus, the EU’s new diplomatic service is either judged by its poten-
tial administrative capacity or by estimations of the (lack of ) military capabilities
that the member states are willing to endow it with. International Relations (IR)
realists have regarded the EU’s foreign policy as ‘naı¨ve’ or even ‘tragic’ due to the
EU’s lack of military strength.6 Constructivists have seen the EU as representing a
‘normative power’,7 but fail to address the crucial relationship between the EU and
1 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 1977), p. 176.
2 C. M. Constantinou and J. Der Derian, ‘Introduction’, in C. M. Constantinou and J. Der Derian (eds),
Sustainable Diplomacies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); J. C. Alexander, ‘‘‘Globalization’’ as
Collective Representation: The New Dream of a Cosmopolitan Civil Sphere’, International Journal of
Politics, Culture, and Society, 19:1–2 (2005), pp. 81–90.
3 EuopeAid is still under the control of the Commission.
4 TEU art. 10A.
5 K. Radtke, ‘The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the Lisbon Treaty: Supra-
national Revolution or Adherence to Intergovernmental Pattern?’, in F. Laursen (eds), The EU’s
Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), p. 163.
6 J. Mearsheimer, ‘A Realist Reply’, International Security, 20:1 (1995), pp. 82–93; A. Hyde-Price, ‘A
‘‘tragic actor’’? A realist perspective on ‘‘ethical power Europe’’’, International Affairs, 84 (2008),
pp. 29–44.
7 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies,
40:2 (2002), pp. 235–58.
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national foreign services. While some observers see the EEAS as finally providing the
EU with the single telephone number that Henry Kissinger (mythically) asked for in
the 1970s,8 critics would point to the continuation of institutional turf-wars.9 These
perspectives differ in their fundamental assumptions about what drives international
politics and more specifically about the nature of the EEAS, but they are all based on
the assumption that material or institutional resources are decisive for international
politics. Few scholars discuss the symbolic struggles involved in the establishment
of this new diplomatic body and their effects on the European diplomacy and
sovereignty.10
This article presents both a negative and a positive thesis. It shows that the
material and institutional dimensions (for example, human resources and legal com-
petences) of the EU’s new diplomatic service have been vastly exaggerated by its
critics. Why is the EEAS then met with such anxiety? The positive thesis is an answer
to this question. I argue that, just as the material and institutional dimensions have
been exaggerated, both critics and supporters have underestimated the symbolic
struggles over the EEAS, which concern the role of the state in diplomacy.
This article develops a Bourdieu-inspired framework conceptualising a European
diplomatic field, that is, a structured social space, where different state- and non-state
actors struggle for dominant positions. In this space, national diplomats have achieved
a dominant position due to the state’s symbolic power. The framework is used to
analyse, first, the constitutional struggle to establish new diplomatic body, focusing
on the treaty negotiations in 2002–3, including whether the head of the EEAS should
be called ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’. Second, I examine the relative posi-
tions and capital of the EEAS and the national foreign services as well as their
struggle to define the ‘genuine’ diplomat, illustrated by the disputes over appoint-
ment of Heads of Delegations and consular affairs. Third, I zoom in on recruitment
and position-takings of three subgroups: seconded national diplomats, civil servants
from the European Commission, and officials from the Council secretariat – who,
together, may effectively construct a diplomatic e´sprit de corps. The analysis demon-
strates that the EEAS is not just innovating or supplementing (as other new diplo-
matic actors) but potentially subversive. The EEAS questions the state as ‘a central
bank for symbolic credit’, meaning its monopoly on symbolic power. This explains
its controversial nature and the counter-strategies adopted by national foreign services
and domestic constituencies to delegitimise the EEAS. From this perspective, ‘Ashton-
bashing’ is not just a question of personality, but also an instance of hysteresis, that is,
the lack of adjustment between field and habitus. The struggles to define the ‘genuine’
diplomat reveal a rupture in the European diplomatic field, pointing towards the
emergence of a hybrid form of diplomacy. The concluding section discusses how an
8 For a discussion of the Kissinger telephone myth, see C. Bickerton, ‘Towards a Social Theory of EU
Foreign and Security Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49:1 (2011), pp. 171–90.
9 S. Stetter, ‘Cross-Pillar Politics: Functional Unity and Institutional Fragmentation of EU Foreign
Policies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4:11 (2004), pp. 720–39; M. E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign
and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004); J. Ba´tora, ‘Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?’, Journal of
European Public Policy, 1:12 (2005), pp. 44–66; T. Diez, I. Manners, and R. Whitman, ‘The Changing
Nature of International Institutions in Europe: The Challenge of the European Union’, Journal of
European Integration, 33:2 (2011), pp. 117–38.
10 But see F. Me´rand, European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
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analysis of symbolic power and social fields provides new avenues for examining
authority, power, and practice in international relations.
A political sociology of symbolic power
That most scholars neglect symbolic power as a central dynamic in diplomacy is not
surprising given that diplomacy has remained largely understudied from a sociological
perspective.11 Traditional definitions of diplomacy highlight ‘the process of dialogue
and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their
purposes by means short of war’, establishing a tight linkage between diplomacy and
state institutions.12 Such definitions are not wrong, but they are incomplete. For in-
stance, although the English School has a long tradition of thinking about diplomatic
culture, it fails to fully acknowledge diplomacy as ‘a form of knowledge produc-
tion’.13 Moreover, traditional approaches overlook that the state’s capacity to carry
out its diplomatic functions hinges in crucial respects on its exercise of symbolic
power. More recently, sociologically oriented IR scholars have fruitfully used Bour-
dieusian concepts to highlight diplomacy as a symbolic practice.14 Drawing on these
studies, this section develops a Bourdieu-inspired approach, which can help explain
why the EEAS is met with such anxiety and what it does to European diplomacy.
The field as a social space of struggles
A field, according to Bourdieu, is a structured space of social relations, centred on
agreed-upon stakes, functioning according to known, if often implicit rules, wherein
actors draw on their capital as a resource to maintain or improve their position in the
field.15 The stratification of a field is based on different forms of capital (for example,
economic, social, and cultural capital) and the efficacy of the capital depends on the
contexts where it is used. Capital in this sense is a form of power resource, which is
as much symbolic as it is material. Each field has a particular mix of relevant capital,
and power cannot be imported easily into a new field. There are a multiple of different
fields (the academic field, the artistic field, and the political field) where different
practices take place.16 The boundaries of the field, and the definition of who popu-
lates the field, are a matter of constant struggle, specifically a by-product of attempts
to establish legitimate domination within the field. Struggles involve legitimising
the stakes themselves, thereby establishing what sorts of capital holdings have what
degree of value.
11 For important and valuable exceptions, see I. B. Neumann, ‘‘‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May
Stand for’’, or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New’, International Political Sociology, 2:1
(2007), pp. 183200; I. B. Neumann and H. Leira, Aktiv og avventende: Utenrikstjenestens liv 1905–
2005 (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2005); I. B. Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign
Ministry (Cornell University Press, 2011).
12 A. Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States (London: Eyre Methuen, 1982), p. 10.
13 I. B. Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats, p. 7.
14 See, for example, F. Me´rand, European Defence Policy; I. B. Neumann and V. Pouliot, ‘Untimely Russia:
Hysteresis in Russian-Western Relations over the Past Millennium’, Security Studies, 20:1 (2011),
pp. 105–37
15 F. Me´rand European Defence Policy, p. 6.
16 P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 229.
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The dynamics of a field arise from the positions, dispositions and position-takings
of agents, which produce habitus. Bourdieu sees habitus as a system of durable dis-
positions that make individuals act, perceive, and think in a particular way and in
accordance with the field throughout time.17 Thus an agent whose habitus is perfectly
adapted to the field possesses a sens pratique, a ‘feel for the game’.18 There is a clear
link between the field-prescribed habitus and field incumbents’ expectations that
newcomers should conform to current field arrangements.19
When newcomers enter a field or agents move across a field, we may see a
hysteresis effect, that is a ‘mismatch between the dispositions agents embody and the
positions they occupy in a given social configuration’.20 As Neumann and Pouliot
note, hysterestetic practices are not ‘objectively’ maladjusted, they are so ‘from the
perspective of dominant agents within the social field’.21 Newcomers entering a field
may lead dominant agents to embark on negative sanctions. Yet habitus does not
preclude newcomers from acting artfully and improvising and it does not prevent
incumbents to respond to new experiences. In fact, dispositions are subject to per-
manent revision.
The state and its symbolic power
The fact that the state diplomat is now the dominant figure in diplomacy hinges on
what Bourdieu termed symbolic power.22 It is the imposition of particular percep-
tions upon social agents who then take the social order to be just. In some senses,
symbolic power is much more powerful than physical power in that it is embedded
in citizens’ modes of action and structures of cognition, imposing a sense of legiti-
macy onto the existing social order. Symbolic power does not operate on the level
of conscious intentions. It refers to power dynamics that are not based on (rational-
calculated) interests. Indeed, ‘its tacit character implies that it can only function
with the complicity of the dominated and even those who do not know that they
practice it’.23
To Bourdieu, the particularity of the state as an organisation, born by and geared
for power concentration, is not material. The specificity of the state is not the accu-
mulation of legitimate physical violence (as Weber would have it), but the monopo-
lisation of legitimate symbolic power.24 The state is first and foremost ‘a central bank
for symbolic credit’, which makes social division, privileges, and domination univer-
sally valid within a given territory and for a given population.25 If there is no state or
the state is essentially contested, the state cannot produce this symbolic power (for
17 P. Bourdieu, Raisons practiques. Sur la the´orie de la raison (Paris: E´ditions du Seuil, 1994), p. 163.
18 P. Bourdieu, Raisons practiques.
19 D. De Clerq and M. Voronov, ‘The Role of Domination in Newcomers’ Legitimation as Entrepreneurs’,
Organization, 16:6 (2009), p. 804.
20 I. B. Neumann and V. Pouliot, ‘Untimely Russia’, p. 105.
21 Ibid., ‘Untimely Russia’, p. 111.
22 P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, for an interesting analysis of symbolic power in interna-
tional trade politics, see M. Eagleton-Pierce, Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organization (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
23 K. Stuvøy, ‘Symbolic Power and (In)Security: The Marginalization of Women’s Security in Northwest
Russia’, International Political Sociology, 4:4 (2010), p. 403.
24 P. Bourdieu, ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, Sociological Theory, 7:1 (1989), p. 21.
25 P. Bourdieu, La Noblesse d’Etat.
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example, Palestine/Israel, Tibet, Vatican). However, Bourdieu constructed his state
theory in a European context and most European states today accumulate this
power.
The state is special because it does not compete for the definitions of legal and
educational status, because it already has pre-eminence over these areas; it has
‘meta-capital’.26 This understanding of power links the social construction of knowl-
edge to the construction of social reality. The state, in other words, can exercise ‘a
power over other species of power . . . and particularly over their rate of exchange’.27
This means that the state is a reference point in social life, exerting its influence not
only in one field, but across all fields. Within each field, holders of different kind of
capital compete with each other for the control over state authority.
Moreover, the state is incorporated in its citizens, as Chopra notes:
The state . . . shapes structures of perception and cognition across the society that the state
governs. This is what Bourdieu means by the phrase ‘Minds of State’ (1998c: 52), suggesting
that the state exists as much an entity ‘outside’ of its citizens as it exists ‘of ’ the citizens.28
This implies that it has become naturalised in the sense that is taken for granted
by its citizens.
Importing Bourdieu’s theory into IR implies, somewhat paradoxically, that the
state is understood in relative terms. The question then becomes how state diplomacy
plays out in relation to other articulations of authority. My operationalisation focuses
on three dimensions of this struggle: (1) the negotiations and debates concerning the
entry of a new actor in the field (constitutional struggle); (2) the relative positions
of newcomers and incumbents and their accumulation of diplomatic capital; and (3)
the classificatory struggles, dispositions, and position-takings of the newcomers and
incumbents.
Types of practices Examples
Constitutional struggles Struggles over what counts
as legitimate competences
(e.g. the boundaries of the
state’s reach).
Treaty negotiations, institu-
tions, formal titles
Relative positions and
capital accumulation
Struggle for diplomatic
capital (both material and
symbolic), including strug-
gles to reproduce or redefine
what counts as capital
Diplomatic staff, missions,
appointments
Classificatory struggles,
dispositions, and position-
takings
Naturalisation of categories,
cognitive schemes through
administrative regulation,
codification, routinisation,
and socialisation
Training, careers
Table 1. The struggle for symbolic power
26 R. Chopra, ‘Neoliberalism As Doxa: Bourdieu’s Theory of the State and the Contemporary Indian
Discourse on Globalization and Liberalization’, Cultural Studies, 3/4:17 (2003), p. 429.
27 P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: Chicago University Press
1992), p. 114.
28 R. Chopra, ‘Neoliberalism As Doxa’, p. 430.
6 Rebecca Adler-Nissen
This article cannot do justice to Bourdieu’s detailed empirical studies, but it
analyses the three dimensions by first examining the treaty negotiations and debate
on the formal competences of the EEAS, including whether the head of the EEAS
should be called ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’. Second, it analyses the struggle
for diplomatic capital by examining the material and symbolic resources at play
in the staffing and geographical representation of the EEAS and national services
respectably. This struggle involves the definition of the ‘genuine’ diplomat as can be
seen in the criticism of the High Representative Catherine Ashton and her appoint-
ment of Heads of Delegations. Finally, it zooms in on the dispositions and position-
taking of the three subgroups: seconded national diplomats, civil servants from the
European Commission, and officials from the Council secretariat – who, together,
become Europe’s new diplomats.
The analysis builds on a combination of data: treaty texts, official documents,
statements, and speeches by leading decision-makers, newspaper articles, and 15 inter-
views with EEAS officials (working in Brussels and EU delegations) and officials
from the British, Danish, French, German, and Polish foreign services as well as a
one year stint in one of the member state’s national foreign services (2010–11).
Newcomers in the European diplomatic field
While the language of diplomacy is rife with references to order, diplomacy is far
from a stable phenomenon. For instance, the differentiation between ‘domestic’ and
‘foreign’ was only institutionalised in the eighteenth century and distinct foreign
ministries only emerged at the end of the eighteenth century.29 The field of diplomacy
is produced by constant struggles for domination. Today, state agents – and more
specifically national foreign services – have acquired a dominant position in what
can be conceptualised as the European diplomatic field.
Newcomers, as mentioned above, may threaten the position of incumbents, in
this case national diplomatic elites. In Europe and beyond, traditional state-based
diplomacy, centred on a foreign minister and a foreign service, is under pressure
from many sides. First, non-state actors, from private companies to non-governmental
organisations, increasingly engage in their own separate diplomatic activities.30
Second, global media, technological developments and increased parliamentary con-
trol of foreign policy represent a growing challenge to traditional diplomacy. For
instance, new communication technologies allow for a more easy access to infor-
mation that used to be monopolised by diplomatic circles. Third, the last decades
have seen a relative decline of the foreign services vis-a`-vis other parts of the state
apparatus.31 Today, most ministries have their own skilled international secretariats
that uphold relations with their peers in other states and they send their own personnel
on diplomatic missions. Moreover, in most European states, there is a greater con-
centration of foreign policy activities around prime ministers and presidents, thereby
29 I. B. Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats, p. 53.
30 A. F. Cooper and B. Hocking, ‘Governments, NonGovernmental Organizations and the Recalibration
of Diplomacy’, Global Society, 14:3 (2000), pp. 361–7.
31 See, for example, D. Spence, ‘The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European
Union Affairs’, in B. Hocking and D. Spence (eds), Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrat-
ing Diplomats (New York: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 18–36.
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side-lining foreign ministries. Together these tendencies imply that international rela-
tions are no longer the exclusive preserve of foreign ministries.32
Nonetheless, national diplomats have generally been in a position to rebuff chal-
lengers, they have largely been able to affirm their mastery over the art of diplomacy.
The practical mastery of the specific knowledge, which is inscribed in past negotia-
tions (treaties), material resources (embassies), institutions (diplomatic immunity),
and rituals (presentation of credentials), recorded and canonised by professionals in
conversation along with scholars and journalists – has become part of the conditions
for a dominant position in the field of diplomacy.
Yet in this process of gate-keeping and rebuffing national diplomats have also
transformed their own practice. One example is Europeanisation.33 Me´rand notes
that national diplomats have been ‘keen to promote [EU] foreign policy cooperation
as a way to protect their turf against the encroachment of specialized ministries’.34
He adds, ‘while most EU policies have been domesticated, European foreign policy
is the only competence that remains truly theirs’.35 Since the 1970s, the member states
have effectively sought to work together through the European Political Cooperation
(EPC), the forerunner of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EPC, which
was kept separate from the European Community (and hence the Commission), led
to a proliferation of high-level meetings, working groups, and coordination among
diplomats form the member states, discussing a variety of topics from non-proliferation
to development issues in Africa.36 In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty took major steps to
coordinate the foreign policies of the EU member states, creating common mecha-
nisms for pursuing shared interests and defining shared objectives in broad terms.37
However, it was only with the Lisbon Treaty (2009) that the EU got its own diplo-
matic service, separate from national foreign policy systems. In this sense, the EEAS
represents a novelty – a quasi-supranational diplomatic corps38 – leading to uncer-
tainty about the future of national foreign services.
Constituting the EU’s diplomatic service
Ian Manners claims that the EU is constituted and constitutes itself through symbols
and symbolism.39 However, this constitutive practice is far from easy. This section
shows that to successfully convey a particular symbolic image takes a lot of effort,
32 In a longer historical perspective, of course, non-state diplomatic actors are by no means a new phe-
nomenon. For instance it was custom that major corporations acted as foreign policy organs of their
home state in many of the imperial adventures.
33 R. Adler-Nissen, ‘Late Sovereign Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 4:2 (2009), pp. 121–
41.
34 F. Me´rand, European Defence Policy, p. 89.
35 Ibid.
36 F. Me´rand, ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense’, Security Studies, 19 (2010), pp. 342–
74.
37 K. E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008),
pp. 3–9.
38 From a legal perspective, the EEAS is an institutional hybrid, which, in coming years, is likely to grow
into a supranational diplomatic service – much like a Commission DG; B. Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-
Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’, Common Market Law Review, 48
(2011), pp. 457–502.
39 I. Manners, ‘Symbolism in European Integration’, Comparative European Politics, 9:3 (2011), pp. 243–
68.
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not least because the EU establishes itself in a field with the nation state’s established
and recognised monopolisation of symbolic power and authority.40
Beyond traditional diplomacy?
The High Representative Catherine Ashton believes that the EEAS represents a new
phenomenon in the diplomatic world. Introducing her proposal for the establishment
of EEAS on 25 March 2010, Ashton stated: ‘the Treaty of Lisbon offers precisely the
opportunity to build modern policy for the modern world – moving beyond tradi-
tional ‘‘diplomacy’’ ’.41 In saying thus, she describes traditional foreign policy (and
national diplomacy) as anachronistic, something that needs to be surpassed because
it does not fit a modern world. Indeed, the EEAS is different from a typical foreign
ministry. It merges pre-existing Commission and Council institutions and instru-
ments (also some that are not traditionally part of a foreign ministry such as military
crisis management, while leaving out others such as export promotion). This is why
Ba´tora calls the EEAS an interstitial organisation – that is, an organisation emerging
in interstices between various organisations.42 However, as the subsequent sections will
demonstrate, the EU’s diplomatic service will not easily transcend national diplomacy –
because of the symbolic power of the nation-state.
There is an intriguing ambivalence in Ashton’s discourse on the EEAS, which
illustrates Bourdieu’s point that in order for a newcomer to establish itself in a field,
it needs to buy into the field’s established codes.43 Being recognised as ‘genuine’
diplomacy is crucial to the success of the EEAS. This is largely due to the role still
played by the nation-state in distributing diplomatic status and prestige, a power
that reaches beyond formally delegated competences.
According to Ashton, one of the greatest challenges facing the EEAS is how to
make an EU delegation just as recognisable and recognised as a national embassy:
When you go into an embassy of a member state anywhere in the world, you know which
country you are in. How will it be that when you go in to look up the External Action Service
somewhere in the world, you’ll know that you are with Europe? It’s that feeling of ‘this is what
we do and this is what we do well’.44
Newcomers must inevitably situate themselves in relation to the history and
established language of the field. Since 1983, the Commission has given its Head of
Delegations a courtesy title of ‘Ambassador’ although it ‘might ventilate diplomatic
sensitivities present in both member states and third countries’.45 What confers the
magical or ontological effectiveness upon an ambassadorial title, ‘which like the
signature of the fashion designer, can increase the value of the object upon which it
40 Part of this analysis is also covered in R. Adler-Nissen, ‘European diplomats: State Nobility and the
Invention of a New Social Group’, in N. Kauppi and M. R. Madsen (eds), Transnational Power Elites:
The New Professionals of Governance, Law and Security (London, Routledge, 2013), pp. 65–80.
41 C. Ashton, Proposal for the European External Action Service, Speech by EUHR Ashton (Brussels:
European Commission, 2010), emphasis added.
42 See J. Ba´tora, ‘The ‘‘Mitrailleuse Effect’’: The EEAS as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics
of Innovation in Diplomacy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51:4 (2013), p. 608.
43 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 170.
44 Ashton, quoted in S. O’Connor, ‘The Accidental Diplomat’, E!Sharp (January–February 2010), p. 14.
45 J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’, The Hague
Journal of Diplomacy, 7:1 (2012), p. 40.
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is affixed?’46 One senior diplomat notes that ‘surely you couldn’t do the job without
the title’, highlighting the importance of traditional diplomatic institutions for the
practice of world politics.47
The national foreign service – with a Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a diplo-
matic corps – remains the recognised model for organised diplomacy. The reference
to state language and symbols was evident when the EEAS was first discussed in
the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002–3.48 In Working Group VII on
‘External Action’, one of the hotly debated issues was the safeguarding national
foreign policy competences and was mentioned in the resumes of all the meetings.
Another related issue was the title for the head of EU’s foreign policy. Proposals
ranging from ‘EU Minister of Foreign Affairs’ and ‘EU Foreign Secretary’ to ‘Euro-
pean External Representative’ were debated. The prevailing view in the Convention
was that the latter ‘had the advantage of not corresponding to a title used at national
level’.49 However, in the final version of the Constitutional Treaty, the High Repre-
sentative was called ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’, following a Franco-
German suggestion, despite opposition from several conventionells.50 The Convention
also discussed establishing a diplomatic service, replete with a diplomatic training
academy.51
While debate largely took place in the Convention, it also led to a broader political
debate. Not only the British, but also the French, Irish, German, and Polish Parlia-
ments discussed the implications of an EU diplomatic service intensely, focusing on
issues of national sovereignty and parliamentary control.52 More than 40 per cent
of the (English-language) news coverage framed the EEAS in terms of a possible
erosion of national sovereignty and diplomacy.53
Following the French ‘non’ and the Dutch ‘nee’ to the Constitutional Treaty
in 2005, the treaty was reopened. A number of ‘red lines’ were pencilled in by the
British government, underlining that foreign policy decisions require unanimity and
that the EU’s foreign policy ‘does not affect the responsibilities of the Member
States . . . for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their
national representation in third countries and international organisations’.54 These
red lines led to what some observers refer to as cosmetic changes, hereunder return-
ing from ‘Union Minister’ to ‘High Representative’. In substance, no changes were
made to the position. However, the title of the head of EU foreign policy was seen
to be symbolically important and had been one of the more difficult concessions
given by the British delegation.55 Already in the treaty negotiations, it was clear
46 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetics’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
(1987), p. 203
47 Interview, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 November 2012.
48 See A. Bogandy, ‘The European Constitution and European Identity: Text and subtext of the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 3:(2–3) (2005),
pp. 295–315.
49 Final report of WG VII, fn. 1.
50 Art I–27; K. Radtke, ‘The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, p. 147.
51 WG VII, WD 55, by I. M. de Vigo, p. 6.
52 For an overview of the debates in the different members states, see ‘Reviewing Member States’ Com-
mitment to the European External Action Service’, EPIN Working Paper, no. 34 (2012).
53 LexisNexis search for ‘European External Action Service’ and ‘Union Foreign Minister’ in all (English-
language) news stories from 2002–9.
54 Declaration 13.
55 See WG VII, WD 40 by P. Hain.
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that the debates over the diplomatic service involved a struggle to impose a legiti-
mate vision of the EU and its foreign policy in relation to national foreign policy.
Following the Treaty’s entry into force in 2009, intense political negotiations
involving the High Representative, the European Parliament, Council and Commis-
sion began, resulting in a set of key decisions for the EEAS.56 These decisions partly
addressed the extension of the domain of the EEAS’s legitimate practices, but they
did not resolve questions of training, recruitment, or whether the EU should play a
bigger role in consular affairs. While much was left for later negotiations, the consti-
tutional struggle resulted in a hybrid diplomatic body. It was built on existing Com-
mission and Council structures, but shaped by the language of national diplomacy.57
The crucial change in the European field is thus not so much that the EU seeks
to construct a common foreign policy; the crucial change lies in the creation of a
new institution, the EEAS, entrusted with diplomatic tasks and, more importantly,
symbolic functions that were hitherto reserved for states only.
Relative positions and diplomatic capital: staff and missions
The relative position of national diplomats (incumbents) and EU diplomats (new-
comers) in the diplomatic field depends on the volume and type of capital to which
they have access. Diplomatic capital has both material and symbolic properties. This
section first accesses the relative size of the EEAS vis-a`-vis the national foreign services
before analysing disputes over consular affairs and the symbolic power attached to it.
More specifically, I compare the total number of staff from each member state
with the number of EEAS staff.58 In subsequent sections, I discuss how the category
‘diplomat’ is part of the struggle over the EEAS. Here it covers staff in the capital/
headquarters and in the diplomatic missions, including local staff members. The
figures represent a rough estimate since the classification of staff functions varies
in the respective member states. It should be noted that most of the officials in the
EU missions today are Commission staff from the environmental, development, and
trade DGs.
As illustrated in Table 2, France and the UK have about three times as much
staff as the EEAS. This is not trivial. It means that the EEAS is only equivalent to a
medium-size member state, such as Belgium. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that
one of the greatest challenges for the new EU diplomats is to gain the trust and
respect of the larger member states, in particular France and the UK.59 Moreover,
with lack of resources, including personnel, the EEAS has difficulties making an
impact on the ground.
56 In particular the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European Ex-
ternal Action Service (2010/427/UE).
57 P. Petrov, K. Pomorska, and S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Introduction: The Emerging EU Diplomatic System:
Opportunities and Challenges after Lisbon’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (2012), p. 2.
58 See R. Balfour and K. Raik (eds), The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies,
EPC Issue Paper, no. 73 (March 2013); see also M. Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s role as a global
actor, Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy (Brussels: CEPS, 2011).
59 D. Allen and M. Smith, ‘Relations with the Rest of the World’, Journal of Common Market Studies,
Annual Review, 49 (2011), pp. 209–30.
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In most cases, figures on staff include locally employed staff, but in some cases
the number of locally employed staff was not available.
However, the number of staff does not necessarily tell us how the material dimen-
sion of diplomatic capital is distributed. It is equally important to examine how the
EU is represented in the world. To explore this issue, I compare the number of dip-
lomatic missions of each member state. Table 3 includes bilateral and multilateral
embassies as well as consular missions (due to lack of detailed information from
some foreign ministries, it is unfortunately not possible to distinguish between
embassies and consulates). Thus for instance, when it comes to French missions, the
exact number is 271 (of which there are 163 embassies, 92 consulates, and 16 repre-
sentations to international organisations).
As Table 3 suggests, the EU fares better when it comes to diplomatic missions.
Established by the European Commission over the last four decades, the EU has
delegations scattered around the globe, not least because of the EU’s trade policy,
its leading role in distributing development aid, and the close links between the six
*This figure does not include local staff. Source: R. Balfour and K. Raik (eds), The European
External Action Service, p. 167.
Table 2. Staff of the EU member states and of the EEAS
**These figures do not include cultural institutes abroad. Source: Balfour and Raik, The
European External Action Service and National Diplomacies, p. 167.
Table 3. Diplomatic missions of the EU member states and the EEAS
12 Rebecca Adler-Nissen
founding members of the EU and their former colonies.60 It is worth noting that the
EU’s geographical representation is even more important given that the EEAS is
only represented outside the EU whereas the numbers for member state missions
also cover representations within the EU.
Consular service: diplomacy for the people
Yet the above comparison only provides a static picture of the distribution of human
and material resources. What makes the EEAS so controversial is its potential to
challenge the dominant position of national diplomats by pushing the boundaries of
the state’s reach and overtaking functions. Indeed, it is future growth, which makes
some national diplomats anxious about cut-downs and replacement. As mentioned,
it has been suggested that EU diplomats should not only be concerned with high
politics, but also everyday consular service, that is, ‘diplomacy for people’. Consular
affairs relate to the protection of a country’s own citizens in a foreign country. For
years, the European Commission has attempted to convince member states to hand
over consular affairs to the Commission’s overseas delegations.61 Already today,
European citizens have the right to be offered diplomatic and consular protection
by other member states and to be treated in the same way as the nationals of other
EU states if they find themselves in a third country where their own state is not
represented.62 The (potential) role of the EEAS in providing consular protection has
not been clearly defined.63 The Council Decision reads:
The Union delegations shall, acting in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 35 TEU,
and upon request by Member States, support the Member States in their diplomatic relations
and in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries on
a resource-neutral basis.64
The December 2011 EEAS evaluation report concluded that ‘it is difficult to
see how this objective could reasonably be achieved ‘on a resource neutral basis’.
Currently, the EEAS is not demandeur due to lack of resources and fear of burning
its fingers of possible difficult cases.65
However, some member states and observers actively support the idea of letting
the EEAS take over consular work, seeing this as a welcome support to national con-
sular services in light of globalisation and the convergence of national interests.66
Moreover, for some small and medium-sized member states with few diplomatic
60 The EU’s predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, opened its first mission in London
in 1955, three years after non-EU countries began to accredit their missions in Brussels to the Com-
munity. Since then, the number of delegations has grown in numbers and tasks.
61 See A. M. Ferna´ndez, ‘Consular Affairs in the EU: Visa Policy As a Catalyst for Integration?’, The
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 1:3 (2008), p. 27. According to the Vienna Convention on consular rela-
tions of 1963 the functions of consular protection and assistance are the exclusive responsibility of
states. See also the European Commission’s communication Consular protection for EU citizens in third
countries: State of play and way forward (COM(2011) 149).
62 Art 20, TEC.
63 K Raik, ‘Serving the citizens? Consular role of the EEAS grows in small steps’, EPC Policy Brief
(30 April 2013); Interview EEAS HQ, 14 May 2013; Interview, EU Delegation, 2 June 2013.
64 Art. 5–10.
65 Interview, EEAS HQ, 14 May 2013.
66 Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s role as a global actor.
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representations, the EEAS provides new opportunities for diplomatic representation
that would not otherwise exist.67 Also for the bigger member states, this may be
attractive, as they currently have to deal with EU citizens whose countries of origin
do not have embassies in their host nations.68 In this perspective, the EEAS is
not seen as an alternative to national foreign services, but rather as an additional
platform – just as the UN system or any other multilateral body.
So far, however, this overtaking of consular affairs has met too much opposition
from a number of member states. Although they may see the practical usefulness of
a greater role of the EU in consular affairs, decision-makers and parliamentarians
worry about a ‘substitution effect’. For instance, in 2010, during a House of Lords
debate on the new diplomatic service, an anxious Lord Pearson of Rannoch asked:
‘Can the noble Lord give us a clear assurance that there will be any British embassies
left in 10 years’ time?’ His question was followed by a remark by Baroness Park of
Monmouth:
However excellent the EU may be, it is not reasonable to expect a mixed EU representation to
look after our national commercial interests and our national defence interests or indeed to
handle the issue of passports and entry into this country. We shall need our own missions.
I want to be assured that we shall not lose them in a splendid cost-cutting exercise by the
Treasury.69
Also outside the UK, there is opposition. The Finish government reacted criti-
cally when Germany proposed to merge national embassies in Asia to make member
state representation more cost-efficient. In Ireland, the government-ordered McCarthy
report from 2008 on where to cut in public spending recommended shutting down
Irish embassies and instead rely on EU’s diplomacy, ‘making the idea of separate
Irish embassies representing Irish foreign policy a thing of the past’.70 In light of the
austerity measures and cut downs in national foreign ministries, the state monopoly
on providing consular services to nationals is likely to gradually disappear. If this
happens, only national export and investment promotion and public diplomacy will
remain responsibilities that rest solely with the national embassies. This helps explain
why the EEAS is met with some concern in member states.
If EU delegations take over consular affairs, it will not only be a practical, but a
highly symbolic move. The embassy is much more than a place of representation; it
is the naturalisation of the state abroad and a reminder of our nationality through
consular protection. As former US Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan
puts it, ‘Embassies are unique architectural subjects. Perhaps no other public buildings
are of such symbolic importance: much more than our domestic public buildings, their
appearance establishes an image of the American government and people.’71 Whereas
companies and NGOs engage in both innovation and imitation of state diplomatic
67 See also I. Manners and R. Williams (eds), The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p. 262.
68 A Rettmann, ‘France keen for EU diplomats to beef up security, consular services’, EUObserver (20
March 2013); Interview, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2013; see also K Raik, ‘Serving
the citizens?’.
69 House of Lords, Main Chamber Debates 25 January 2010, No. 716: Part No. 31 (2010).
70 E. Delaney, ‘Changes abroad will now reinvent diplomacy here’, The Independent (13 November
2011).
71 Moynihan quoted in J. C. Loeffler, ‘The Architecture of Diplomacy: Heyday of the United States
Embassy-Building Program, 1954–1960’, The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians
(1990), pp. 251–78.
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practices, they are often coopted by national foreign services. In contrast, if the EEAS
performs symbolic functions such as political representation or takes over consular
work, it questions more explicitly the distinctiveness of national foreign services.
To conclude, in material terms, the EEAS does not currently challenge national
diplomacy, but this may change in the future, especially in light of the EU’s impres-
sive geographical representation. However, diplomatic capital is not only a question
of material resources, it is also linked to belief and is the product of subjective acts of
recognition.
Classificatory struggles: defining the ‘genuine’ diplomat
The categories used to perceive and appreciate diplomacy are always bound to his-
torical context. Linked to a situated and historical universe, they make particular
moves possible and make others seem out of place. The construction of the EEAS
has produced a classificatory struggle over what it takes to be a ‘genuine’ diplomat
in Europe today. I will illustrate this struggle by examining the skirmish that arose
following the nomination of Catherine Ashton and the first Heads of Delegation.
Ashton and the hysteresis effect
What makes a ‘genuine’ diplomat? As Bourdieu argues, we ‘must replace the onto-
logical question with the historical question of the genesis of the universe’, that is
the diplomatic field within which the value of a diplomat is continuously produced
and reproduced. In our case, the combatants are the national foreign services and
the various groups of people that will end up in the EEAS. The struggle is crucial be-
cause the winner(s) will define the categories that give way to a distinction between
‘true’ diplomats and ‘imitators’.
The choice of Ashton as head of the new service has generated much debate.
Does she possess the right qualifications, does she have enough diplomatic capital?
Romano Prodi, former president of the European Commission, described the choice
of Ashton as ‘mind-blowing’72 pointing to the fact that the former trade commis-
sioner and member of Labour had no foreign policy experience.
Behaviour or practices become vulnerable to negative sanctions when individuals
are faced with a situation or environment that is too remote from the one where they
usually ‘normally’ fitted. This is what Bourdieu called the ‘hysteresis effect’. Ever
since her nomination, ‘Ashton-bashing’ has been increasing. This is the name that
diplomats and officials use for the increasingly loud criticism that Ashton receives
from member state capitals.73 Reports from the corridors of PSC meetings are all
about the EEAS’s ‘poor preparations of foreign affairs minister’s meetings’, ‘lack of
in-depth knowledge’, ‘Ashton’s paranoia’ and need for more ‘strategy and leader-
ship’.74 National foreign services are increasingly undermining Ashton’s credibility
72 J. Leone, ‘Divergent views over Van Rompuy and Ashton seem largely negative in Italy’, EU-27 Watch,
No. 9 (2010), available at: {www.EU-27watch.org}, accessed 20 November 2012.
73 Field notes.
74 Field notes, Interviews, EEAS HQ, 14 May 2013; EU Delegation, 10 June 2013.
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as a ‘genuine’ diplomat. Letters are circulated between foreign ministers, criticising
Ashton and the EEAS. Former Belgian Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere went so
far as to publically criticise the EEAS’s analysis of the EU’s strategic partners for
a Foreign Affairs meeting, claiming that it was ‘very disappointing’.75 It appears
that Ashton’s habitus is in tensions with the field, consequently, she is perceived by
national diplomats as a fish out of water. When Ashton moved into the Commission
building (before the EEAS headquaters was ready), it was seen as a highly symbolic
move by national diplomats. Now the EEAS has its own building with a top floor
where, following Ashton’s request, the corporate board is located in an open office,
which is very non-MFA and not liked by national diplomats.76
To be clear, many foreign ministries genuinely support an integrated European
foreign service. However, in engaging with Ashton and the EEAS they also repro-
duce their own experiences and understandings of diplomacy and hence the symbolic
power of the state. The EU’s diplomatic service makes national diplomats aware
of their distinctiveness as national representatives.77 Notwithstanding the general
respect for EU-related diplomatic work, there is – in all the member states – a
profound scepticism when it comes to the EEAS. ‘They are not real diplomats, they
have no experience’, a senior Head of Department in the Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs explains, echoing similar statements by her colleagues in other EU member
states.78
What matters is not only whether Asthon and her staff really are competent, but
the way in which national diplomats, the dominant players, imply that the state is the
only source of diplomatic capital. Indeed, the value of Ashton as a diplomat owes to
the structure of the diplomatic field. Not everyone is in a position to ‘command an
open or tacit acceptance of his or her ‘‘power of naming’’ ’.79 The foreign ministers
from France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden clearly are in such a position. In December
2011, they circulated a non-paper accusing Ashton and the service of basic failings
and dysfunctions.80 The attack pushed Ashton to thank the foreign ministers for
their ‘support’ and ‘input’.81 What some observers see as a question of personality
takes place on the background of a struggle over the stakes in the European diplo-
matic field. In sum, ‘diplomat’ is not an individual property but rather ‘an accom-
plishment resulting from collective sense-making’, which means that a newcomer
cannot simply designate herself as such but must receive the social categorisation
‘diplomat’ from other field participants.82
Appointing heads of delegations
The hysteresis effect is also at play at the level of Heads of Delegations. National
diplomats have embarked on ‘rearguard action to minimize the innovations of the
75 M. Labaki, ‘Steven Vanackere critique Catherine Ashton’, Le Soir (4 May 2011).
76 See Ba´tora, The ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’, p. 608.
77 Interview, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 August 2011.
78 Interview, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 May 2011; Interview, French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 10 May 2011.
79 S. Guzzini, ‘Power’, in R. Adler-Nissen (ed.), Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key
Concepts (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 83.
80 {http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/201/201203/20120321_
nonpaperfms_en.pdf} accessed 20 November 2012.
81 Field notes.
82 DeClercq and Voronov, The Role of Domination, p. 800.
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Lisbon Treaty’.83 On 1 January 2010, all former ‘European Commission delegations’
were renamed ‘European Union delegations’ and were gradually upgraded into
embassy-type missions invested with more power than the regular delegations. As
mentioned, recruitment procedures were not settled during the treaty negotiations.
Consequently, Ashton operated in an institutional vacuum when the first Heads of
Delegations were appointed.
One of the most important EU delegations is the one in Washington DC. To the
great surprise and anger of most capitals, Ashton appointed Joa˜o Vale de Almeida, a
former Head of Cabinet for Jose´ Manuel Barroso, as the new EU envoy – Head of
Delegation – to the US.84 Because the post became vacant the before entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission made the appointment according to previous
guidelines. Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister, immediately wrote to Catherine
Ashton, complaining that member states were not consulted on the appointment of
Almeida.85 In his letter, Bildt also recalled an ‘understanding’ reached in 2004 that
the Washington job should go to ‘a person with experience from a high political
post’. In 2004, the Commission had appointed John Bruton, a former Irish prime
minister, as its envoy to the US. Bildt was not only defending member state interests
against Barroso’s parachutage of his former chief of staff, he was also saying that
Almeida lacked the diplomatic experience that comes with being a former prime
minister or senior diplomat (an experience that a civil servant from the Commission
arguably does not possess).86
The critique of Ashton’s decision to appoint Almeida was not only about her
failure to listen to the opinions of the member states. It also had to do with the very
definition of what makes a good diplomat. Indeed, turf wars between the Commission
and the member states cannot be understood without taking into consideration what
is actually at stake in the diplomatic field in Europe. The Almeida incident high-
lighted the struggle over the kind of knowledge and resources that should confer
power and status to the EEAS. Or as one diplomat explained, Barroso spotted this
‘transititional phase to install Almeida, so that a Commission rather than a member
state leader would be in charge’.87
In a 2010 letter addressed to Ashton, British Foreign Minister David Miliband
and his Swedish counterpart Carl Bildt insisted that posts in the new diplomatic
service be distributed in a transparent way, ‘we will not achieve a step-change in the
way we think without also changing some of the thinkers’.88 The Polish Institute for
International Affairs showed – unsurprisingly – that the Heads of Delegation were
predominantly people with a long experience within the Commission. Consequently,
the Heads of Delegation ‘have noticeable knowledge of the procedures and organisa-
tional culture of the EU institutions, but [are] less familiar with the host countries
83 D. Spence, ‘The Early Days of the European External Action Service’, p. 116.
84 The nomination took place on 17 February 2010.
85 T. Vogel, ‘Swedish Minister Criticises Washington Appointment’, European Voice (22 February 2010).
86 The Almeida incident reflects Neumann’s observation (‘To Be a Diplomat’, International Studies
Perspectives, 6 (2005), pp. 72–93 that there is a status hierarchy between the ‘hero script’ and the
‘bureaucratic script’ in diplomacy. The hero is the active diplomat, making a difference abroad, while
the bureaucrat is a civil servant in a dusty office ‘back home’.
87 Interview, EEAS HQ, 14 May 2013.
88 D. Milliband and C. Bildt, letter to Baroness Ashton, 3 March 2010.
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and regions’.89 Once again, the langue used is that of lack of ‘genuine’ diplomatic
experience.
The identification of lack of ‘feel for the game’ is important for our understand-
ing of the EEAS. Following the nomination of Almeida, Ashton adjusted the way
she appointed Head of Delegations. The need for experience from national foreign
services is increasingly reflected in the way top positions are filled. In October 2010,
former French Ambassador to the US, Pierre Vimont became secretary-general of
the EEAS. Chief Operating Officer, David O’Sullivan, an Irish diplomat with a long
career in Brussels, joined the leadership of the EEAS.
Ashton has also responded to concerns about recruitment of national diplomats,
including those from new member states. In the 2012 rotation, five of the seven
national diplomats appointed to management positions were from those member
states, which joined the Union in 2004 and 2007.90 Today, about one-third of the
management positions in Delegations are held by diplomats from national foreign
ministries. However, to be recognised as a ‘genuine’ diplomatic service does not
merely involve appointing more national diplomats, it concerns the adjustment
between field and habitus.
Towards a hybrid diplomatic culture: recruitment and careers
The European diplomatic field is multinational; it draws on 27 different diplomatic
traditions and recruitment systems. The understanding of the model diplomat is not
necessarily the same in each member state.91 Within each national diplomatic field –
which is part of the power field of each member state – a relative distribution of
capital is established. In France, the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) is a
unique agency for training public service cadres, including those that end up working
at the Quai d’Orsay.92 Depending on the particular national tradition, certain char-
acteristics are rewarded (high class background), while others are punished (working
class background). Such categories and silent hierarchies define the foreign service
of each state. Most southern European states (for example, France, Spain, Italy,
Greece, and Portugal) build on the concours tradition where the selection of diplo-
mats is based on elaborate tests of knowledge, combining multiple choice, essays,
and oral presentations. In contrast, in the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, recruit-
ment is based on psychometric and problem-solving tests where general knowledge
plays a lesser role.93 Scandinavia, Germany, and Austria tend to combine the two
traditions.
Yet national foreign services are only partly self-referring. As Cross notes with
regard to intra-EU diplomacy:
89 R. Formuszewicz and J. Kumoc, ‘The Practice of Appointing the Heads of EU Delegations in the
Wake of Council Decision on the European External Action Service’, Report of the Polish Institute of
International Affairs (2010), p. 27.
90 ‘High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints 17 new Heads and Deputy Heads of Delegation’, 16
May 2012, A 228/12
91 V. Karyagin, ‘The Diplomatic Service: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow’, International Affairs, 12:40
(1994), pp. 32–44.
92 P. Bourdieu, La Noblesse d’Etat.
93 Respective webpages of the mentioned MFAs, Interview, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 May
2013.
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Internal diplomacy has worked well in large part because of the similarities in the ways
member-states select and train their diplomats. Diplomats typically come from the same top
universities, they tend to share a similar social background, and they undergo the same type
of formal and on-the-job-training.94
Moreover, the EU member states have developed common ideas about what con-
stitutes a good diplomat, which postings are most prestigious, etc.95 For instance, a
posting in the Permanent Representation in Brussels is regarded as a high-status
post, increasing your diplomatic capital. To be COREPER ambassador gives a great
deal influence and expertise, even superseding the position of ambassador to the
US.96
Traditionally, diplomats see themselves as responsible for promoting, for exam-
ple, Sweden, France, Italy, and Poland. They have different ‘minds of state’. This is
not likely to change. Yet with the establishment of the EEAS, Sweden, France, Italy,
and Poland have to recruit personnel from their own ranks to promote European
interests in the EEAS. In principle, at least one third of all staff will come from the
member states. This was one of the major results that were achieved following the
difficult EEAS negotiations. As of June 2012 the share of member state diplomats
has reached 27 per cent.97
Agents arriving in positions via different trajectories bring with them features of
their distinct habitus. On 1 January 2011, the first employees were permanently
transferred to the EEAS. 585 posts were transferred from the Commissions External
Relations DG (which ceased to exist); 93 from the Commissions Development DG
(the remainder of which merged into Development Cooperation DG); 436 from the
Commission delegations; and 411 from the Council of the European Union. These
joined with the 118 new employees – primarily from the member states – to create a
staff of 1,643 on the day of transfer. Today, the EEAS has reached approximately
3,400 employees.
Following the formal construction of the EEAS, a recruitment system has been
set up with assessment centres that pre-select candidates. Diplomats in the member
states have generally been critical towards the slowness of the recruitment processes,
which is largely due to lack of resources in the EEAS and the fact that recruitment is
one of the most hotly debated issues. While the member states may propose their
own candidates, the EEAS makes the decision on whom to appoint.
The drafters of the Council Decision found it necessary to write a characteristic
EU compromise in Art 6(6): ‘All appointments in the EEAS shall be based on merit
and on the broadest possible geographical basis. The staff of the EEAS shall com-
prise a meaningful presence of nationals from all the Member States’ (emphasis
added). The former British foreign secretary indirectly recognised this when asked
whether the recruitment would be based on merit or national quota:
94 M. K. Cross, ‘Building A European Diplomacy: Recruitment and Training to the EEAS’, European
Foreign Affairs Review, 16:4 (2011).
95 F. Me´rand, European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State.
96 Interview, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 May 2011; Interview French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 10 May 2011.
97 R. Balfour and K. Raik (eds), The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies, p. 170.
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It is very important indeed that appointments should be made through a transparent proce-
dure and be based on merit, not nationality . . . We will not want this to be on a traditional
concours system . . . We need the right skills and experience for the job. For example, the
Chinese may need to have an EU Head of Delegation that has a strong knowledge of the
region and even speaks Mandarin if he wants to have the maximum impact.98
Referring indirectly to the FCO recruitment procedures, the British foreign secre-
tary clearly distanced himself from the types of merits that counts in the Commission
system (or some of the other national diplomatic traditions).99
Another, partly related, worry concerns the EEAS’s neutrality. Instead of repre-
senting the whole Union, it is feared that the EEAS will be controlled by one of the
larger member states. French media, for instance, regularly suggest that France loses
power to the UK in the new diplomatic service.100 There have also been concerns,
notably in leaked German foreign policy documents, that the British dominate the
whole structure of the EEAS.101 It is believed that Ashton is open to influence from
London and that there are a large number of British staff in high-ranking positions
already waiting to take on the top jobs in the EEAS.102 Yet among the four members
in the EEAS corporate board and the seven managing directors, two are British, one
is French, and one is German. The others are from other member states. The ques-
tion of national balance is sensitive, but it is not the most important issue when it
comes to the EU’s diplomatic service. What is really at issue is the struggle of the
EEAS to be seen as a competent and legitimate diplomatic body.
While member states compete between themselves, they increasingly also position
themselves, collectively, against the EEAS. For instance, they criticise the balance
between seconded national diplomats and those from EU institutions, and what
they see as the continued dominance of Commission officials.103 Meanwhile Com-
mission officials find that the member states are engaged in a ‘hostile take-over’.104
One seconded national diplomat in a Middle Eastern EU Delegation explains it
characteristically:
I have a different mentality. I see things differently than my colleagues who are old DG Relex
and Council secretariat people. Due to my training in a national foreign ministry, I share
knowledge with my colleagues as much as possible, while my Commission colleagues operate
with an inside-the-box thinking and clearly demarcated areas of responsibility. When classic
administrators are put together with strategic policy-makers, it limits our agenda-setting
possibility.105
In sum, diplomats in the EU member states see themselves as sharing a particular
professional culture: They are arguably trained to be ‘strategic’, to ‘share knowledge’,
to follow a ‘political line’.106 This culture does not include the civil servants from the
Commission; they have different dispositions, loyalties, and experiences.107 Commis-
sion officials have entered the EU institutions through the EU concours system. They
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compete for top positions within the Commission DGs in different ways than national
diplomats compete to be posted to the most prestigious capitals.
The diplomatic exchange rate
The European diplomatic field is an area where possessors of different types of capital
compete over different principles of recognition and privilege. At stake in these strug-
gles is the relative value and strength of the capital possessed by the rival groups.
Figuratively speaking, this value is settled by the going exchange rate for various
forms of diplomatic capital. In the diplomatic field, the state has hitherto ‘exercised
a power over other species of capital . . . and particularly over their rate of
exchange’.108
One may consider the relative value and potency of different kinds of diplomatic
capital (for example, traditional embassy work vs. experience from the EEAS).
Would a national diplomat serving the EEAS for a couple of years return home
with more or less diplomatic capital? While the Permanent Representations in Brussels
is generally regarded a stepping stone (and a lot of hard work) for ambitious and
striving diplomats, it is less certain that EEAS gives the same kind of recognition.
Italy’s Foreign Minister Franco Frattini writes:
These EU diplomats, who will return to their national foreign offices when their EEAS
mandate expires, will be advocates of ‘communitarising’ training initiatives at home, helping
their own administrations to better understand how the EU now works on the international
stage.109
This requires, however, that EEAS experience be welcomed at home. Clearly,
there is (still) no naturalisation of the categories and cognitive schemes produced by
the EEAS.
Seen from the perspective of the national career diplomat, the EEAS poses a
number of difficult questions relating to the symbolic power of the state. Would a
career in the EEAS enhance your status? Since the EEAS is yet untested and its
future success unknown, diplomats hesitate to opt for EEAS positions, as this move
may prove detrimental to their future career.110 To acquire a dominant position in
the field, the EEAS needs to be able to guarantee that when national diplomats as
well as Council and Commission civil servants participate in the European diplo-
matic experiment, they will not lose ‘market value’ but keep or even improve their
distinctions and privileges.
Interestingly, from a Commission perspective, a similar dynamic is at work. Pre-
viously, the Commission officials working at the delegations (typically from DG
Relex) were certain to get a job afterwards and could finally advance to become
Head of Delegation – or even more prestigiously – Area Boss.111 With the EEAS,
however, such a career prediction becomes more tentative. Will the Commission offi-
cial be able to continue his or her career – return to the Commission, possibly in
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another DG after serving in the EEAS? This has been one of the questions bothering
EU civil servants; they wonder what will happen to them if they remain within the
EEAS system.112 Hence, the three groups – Commission officials, Council officials,
and national diplomats – share the same concern: How can I keep my status and
prestige when returning home (to a national headquarter or Brussels)?
The creators of the new diplomatic service are conscious of the importance of
careers and status and struggle to ensure that seconded staff from the member states
has the same:
opportunities, rights and obligations (including functions, responsibilities, promotion, pay,
leave and social benefits) as those of staff coming from the two other sources of origin.113
By doing so, they also hope to cultivate ‘a common diplomatic culture’, as one
diplomat involved in the negotiations explains.114 As Ashton explains:
Ultimately this is all about people. Our staff is our most precious resource. We must make
sure that they feel confident with the new structures. I will also see to it that colleagues from
Member-States can find their place quickly in the EEAS and enrich it with their experience.115
In more general terms, the establishment of the EEAS is accompanied by a sort
of reflective return by the producers of their own production in the diplomatic field.
As one EEAS diplomat notes: ‘Pursuing a career in the EEAS is only attractive if
it gives prestige.’116 This is where observers and field members point to the possible
socialisation effects of a European diplomatic academy.117 As Bourdieu argued,
systems of training and recruitment provide more than a curriculum of standardised
substantive knowledge to students; they also introduce and naturalise fundamental
categories of perception, which then shape how people understand society and their
place within it.118 To repeat Ashton’s words, this is indeed all about people and the
meaning they confer to institutions such as the EEAS.
EU-level diplomacy relies on national foreign policy elites to succeed.119 Some-
what paradoxically then, in actively sanctioning what it means to be a ‘genuine’
diplomat, national diplomats may end up supporting the European diplomatic experi-
ment. This has important implications. First, it would be a mistake to see the EEAS
as radically different from a national diplomatic service in that it draws upon the
very same categories that it seeks to transcend. The diplomatic field is made up by
agents – field incumbents and newcomers alike – who contribute to the construction
and reproduction of the field by struggling to maintain or gain more power in it.120
Thus, the EU’s new diplomats may be more likely to function as agents of repro-
duction than subversion. Second, the EEAS leads to adjustment of dispositions
and position-takings of national diplomats and Commission officials. In short, the
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transformation of diplomacy in Europe may result not only from the successful
contestation of the field’s dominant views by new actors such as the EEAS, but also
from endogenous change, as invoked by some of the field incumbents. European
foreign ministries may begin to innovate as part of the struggle for dominance.
Conclusion
A range of different processes, commonly known as globalisation, multilateralisation,
and privatisation challenge national diplomacy. Yet to a large degree diplomacy still
takes place within a field of rules and roles established over hundreds of years where
states officially communicate with each other. We should thus avoid looking at new
diplomatic actors in isolation, and instead ask how they adapt, transform or under-
mine this field. Existing analyses of ‘new diplomacy’ have limitations, which have
worked against the development of more nuanced understandings of the evolution
of diplomacy. One limitation concerns an overemphasis on material and institutional
capacities, often at the expense of understanding the manifold cultural and social
sources and effects of power. Thus, we are either presented with the rather ahistorical
argument that new actors on the diplomatic scene will never be effective because
states remain dominant (in terms of military or institutional capacities) or we are
led to the conclusion that new actors will replace the national foreign services
because of globalisation and growing interdependence. The problem is that we learn
little about the relative significance of different diplomatic groups and we learn even
less about how the new diplomats fight for recognition and legitimacy in a highly
structured diplomatic field. Moreover, we lose sight of the counter-strategies adopted
by the national foreign services.
This article began by drawing attention to an apparent puzzle: Why is the EU’s
External Action Service met with such anxiety when it is only the equivalent of a
foreign service of medium-sized member state? This article has shown that a central,
yet understudied, element in the struggle over the EU’s new diplomatic service con-
cerns symbolic power. Drawing on Bourdieu’s sociology, I have then argued that the
EU’s diplomatic service challenges the meta-capital of the state, that is, its ability to
monopolise symbolic power. I have demonstrated that the EEAS’s current size
hardly represents a threat to the national diplomatic services. Although the new
diplomatic service has an impressive geographical representation compared to most
member states, the size of its staff is equal to Belgium’s foreign service. Indeed, the
issue is more about future growth, which makes national services anxious about cut-
downs and replacement. I have analysed the struggle to define the ‘genuine’ diplomat
through what might at first appear as rather mundane issues of career patterns, train-
ing, recruitment policy and professional privileges. It is not so much the formal com-
petencies or material resources of the EEAS that challenges the state; its challenge
relies on its ability to accumulate symbolic power.
Alternative explanations for the struggle over the EEAS are possible. From an
institutional perspective, the foreign minister letters to Ashton merely represent
attempts to improve an unsatisfying situation, which may be solved in a few years.
Institutional turf-wars, lack of resources, unclear command structures, mistrust between
Commission and seconded national diplomats and low morale are to be expected.
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Yet this does not explain the intensity of the engagement by member states in ques-
tions about competences, titles such as ‘Union Foreign Minister’, consular affairs,
recruitment, training, etc.
Cases such as the EEAS are ideal for exploring the dynamics through which spe-
cific international practices become naturalised, because it is precisely in moments of
contestation over the boundaries of legitimate state practice that the historical con-
tingency of the state’s symbolic power is exposed. The main analytical benefit is
that we can address the way in which the EEAS short-circuits the distinctions and
individual dispositions that uphold a state-centric diplomatic system. ‘Ashton-bashing’
is not just a question of personality, but also an instance of hysteresis.
Europe is likely to see the emergence of a hybrid form of diplomacy. Paradoxi-
cally, if EU diplomats become successful foreign policy players, it will be because of
the engagement of national foreign ministers. Rather than seeing the EU construct-
ing wholly autonomous structures, the Union’s own diplomacy largely depends on
the traditional ‘state nobility’ in the 27 foreign services commuting to Brussels –
also because one third of the staff comes from the member states. For this hybrid
diplomacy to develop, the EEAS needs to accumulate the kind of symbolic power
hitherto reserved for national state bureaucracies. This does not mean that the EU
will become a state, but it will involve a change in the established and recognised
definition of the ‘genuine’ diplomat in Europe. To be recognised as a ‘genuine’ diplo-
matic services requires more than appointing national diplomats, it concerns the
adjustment between field and habitus.
A focus on symbolic power resituates conventional approaches to the study of
diplomacy, sovereignty, and the transformation of world politics. In their book on the
diplomatic corps, Sharp and Wiseman conclude that ‘the world primarily constituted
as and by a society of states remains a critical anchor of all the other organizing prin-
ciples in terms of what we think about social life’.121 However, this role as anchor
depends on the state – and its diplomats – being able to remain the ‘central bank
for symbolic credit’. While the state currently enjoys ontological priority, rival ways
of organising political life are emerging. Given the focus of much IR research with
exposing the demise of state sovereignty through globalisation and other processes,
this article is critical in highlighting the symbolic nature of these processes. While
we may all agree that new actors have gained a more prominent position in world
politics, scholars still need to explain the processes through which they become
authoritative relative to the state. A non-state actor might challenge certain parameters
of the diplomatic field, but not threaten the fundamental features that allow states to
sanction misbehaviour. In short, newcomers do not necessarily perform as agents of
change.
More broadly then, the application of Bourdieu’s theory to the study of inter-
national relations can help expose power struggles inherent to the emergence of new
actors and practices. This perspective may contribute to the practice turn in IR,122
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which has been criticised for overlooking power. Indeed a practice approach should
not ‘obscur[e] the broader context in which practices occur.’123 Be they legal,
cultural, financial or military, practices are always situated in and shaped by a
structured social space. Thus, it is not an individual action or property that makes a
practice ‘diplomatic’; rather it is an honour or measure of prestige granted by the
field. Diplomacy, as all other social fields, always has a symbolic dimension and
those that master this dimension will dominate the field.
123 R. Duvall and A. Chowdhury, ‘Practices of Theory’, in E. Adler and V. Pouliot (eds), International
Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011), p. 348.
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